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Avoid These Eleven Common Evidentiary Mistakes
John Rumel
Tim Gresback
he law provides attorneys
with numerous tools not only
to prove a case, but to prevent
the other side from submit-
ting improper evidence. Un-
fortunately, all too often, lawyers
make misplaced objections or fail
to make appropriate objections at
trial-because they both misunder-
stand the rules governing the admis-
sibility of evidence and also have not
fully evaluated the objection's strate-
gic consequences. Mastering the fun-
damentals of effective evidentiary
objections opens the door to a more
sophisticated and effective litigation
strategy. Here are some of the most




The General Objection: Irrelevant,
immaterial and incompetent: In the
early years of Idaho trial practice,
objecting to evidence as irrelevant,
immaterial and incompetent was a
common and successful practice.1
Indeed, as of 1930 and as late as
1965, objections on these grounds
were sustained by Idaho judges
and affirmed by the Idaho Supreme
Court.2 However, by the mid-1930s,
the Idaho Supreme Court began to
question the sufficiency of a general
objection.3 Likewise, an increasing
number of treatises viewed an ob-
jection that evidence was irrelevant,
immaterial and incompetent as an
impermissible general objection,
only to be sustained if the evidence
was not admissible on any grounds.4
Thus, by the early 1970s, the Idaho
high court held that the mantra was
improper when a more specific ob-
jection might have been made.s
"[O]ne of the most overworked formulas is an objection that the
evidence is'incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial:Its rhythm and
alliteration seduce some lawyers to employ it as a routine ritual."I
- Professor Charles McCormick
Professor Charles McCormick, an
early national authority on the Law
of Evidence, decried attorneys' use of
the general objection, stating in his
hornbook that "[o]ne of the most
overworked formulas is an objection
that the evidence is 'incompetent, ir-
relevant and immaterial: Its rhythm
and alliteration seduce some lawyers
to employ it as a routine ritual",
Similarly, more recent commenta-
tors have referred to the general ob-
jection as a "hackneyed alliterative
phrase?7
Take away: The alliteration is out-
dated and should be avoided.
Objection: Relevance: Relevance
objections are often lodged without
an understanding that relevance is
very easy to establish. Under I.R.E.
401, relevant evidence need only
have "any tendency to make the ex-
istence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the
action more probable or less prob-
able than it would be without the
evidence.'
Professor McCormick uses a
brick wall metaphor to illustrate
how almost all evidence is relevant.9
A party has broad discretion on
how to build its wall of truth, even
if the other side hotly disputes the
existence of every, some, or a single
evidentiary brick offered at trial. As
McCormick explains, "A brick is not
a wall."1 That is, a single item of evi-
dence need not prove every element
of a cause of action. Some evidence
is more compelling than other evi-
dence. A relevance objection is an
improper mechanism to inform a
court that a lawyer does not find the
opponent's proof convincing.
Take away: Many relevance objec-
tions are misplaced because the ad-
missibility threshold is easily met."
Repetitive and reflexive relevance
objections bog trials down and un-
dermine a lawyer's credibility. Rele-
vance objections are best made spar-
ingly.
Objection: Highly Prejudicial
Sometimes evidence drives a nail
through the heart of a claim or de-
fense; its admission is devastating.
Our rules do not reject devastating
evidence-they invite it. In a des-
perate attempt to keep the hammer
from the nail, many lawyers conflate
the purpose of the IRE 403 balanc-
ing test and wrongly think that high-
ly prejudicial evidence is somehow
objectionable.
Under Rule 403, the first inquiry
is whether the proffered evidence is
relevant. As already explained, the
vast majority of evidence is relevant.
Once this easy threshold is crossed,
the court then weighs whether the
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probative value of the evidence will
be "substantially outweighed" by
the danger of "unfair prejudice"
Close calls favor admissibility: evi-
dence is excluded only if the "unfair
prejudice" "substantially" outweighs
the probative value. The Rule 403
balancing test, like our rule on rel-
evance, favors admissibility. An un-
biased eyewitness who clearly sees a
stabbing provides extremely prejudi-
cial testimony. Although highly prej-
udicial, nothing whatsoever about
the evidence is unfair.
By contrast, evidence that the de-
fendant previously stabbed someone
else on a prior occasion requires a
more nuanced analysis. As already
mentioned, the threshold inquiry
does not set a high bar. Certainly, the
fact that a person acted in a certain
way yesterday does not conclusively
prove how the person acted today.
The "any tendency" standard, how-
ever, does not require anything close
to conclusive proof. As such, yester-
day's conduct is indeed relevant in
evaluating today's.
For Rule 403 balancing of a prior
incident, it may help not to consider
whether the prior incident is irrele-
vant, but whether it is "too" relevant.
In other words, jurors may reason
that because the defendant stabbed
before, the defendant is a bad per-
son and should be convicted even if
the proof of the charged incident is
underwhelming.12 Now, the danger
of unfair prejudice is high, and the
need for 403 balancing is more com-
pelling.
Take away: The goal in using the
Rule 403 balancing test is not to
convince the court that the evidence
devastatingly prejudices your case.
Its admission must unfairly preju-
dice your client for a compelling
policy reason that substantially out-
weighs its probative value. The preju-
dice must be unfair, and imbalance
must be substantial.13
Objection: Lack of Foundation:
Admissible evidence cannot arise
from a factual vacuum. For example,
before a party can testify in an auto
collision case that the traffic light
was green at the time of a crash,
numerous predicate foundational
facts should be established-includ-
ing that the witness remembers the
crash, was at the scene, and saw the
traffic light before impact. On direct
exam, foundational facts are usually
elicited through non-leading jour-
nalist questions that start with who,
what, where, when, or how.
Our experience is that
foundation objections, like
relevance objections, are lodged
too frequently-and they
usually backfire.
Our experience is that founda-
tion objections, like relevance ob-
jections, are lodged too frequent-
ly-and they usually backfire. The
overuse of foundation objections
occurs mostly in criminal cases. De-
fenders time and again help prosecu-
tors prove guilt by demanding more
foundation. Prosecutors then shore
up their case and add the missing
facts. Veteran defenders, by contrast,
wait for closing argument to explain
the absence of details.
Take away: Like relevance objec-
tions, just because a foundation ob-
jection can be made does not mean
that it should be made. Avoid the
premature pounce.
Objection: [Blab Blab Blab] - The
Speaking Objection Jurors are not
supposed to hear lawyers argue legal
issues meant for the court. Unfortu-
nately, many lawyers ignore the con-
striction and use an objection as a
showboating opportunity in front of
the jury. Although a few judges may
tolerate such a technique, most will
rebuke it. Objections, when lodged,
must be succinctly stated without a
commentary.14
Take away: Legal objections to ev-
idence neither present an opportu-
nity to charm jurors nor help a law-
yer establish credibility. Bombarded
with speaking objections-particu-
larly those that are overruled, a jury
may begin to tire and wonder why
the wordy objector is slowing down
the process. Even worse, the jury
may consider the source rather than
the content of the objection and not
take legitimate objections seriously.
Objections regarding the form of the
question or substance of the answer
Objection: Leading Question (on
Re-direct Examination) Under the
Idaho Rules of Evidence, the law
concerning use of leading questions
on direct and cross-examination is
well established and well under-
stood: "[hleading questions should
not be used on the direct examina-
tion of a witness except as may be
necessary to develop the testimony
of the witness" including examining
"a hostile witness, an adverse party,
or a witness identified with an ad-
verse party ... "1 In contrast,"[o]rdi-
narily leading questions should be
permitted on cross-examination"'
But what about on re-direct exami-
nation?
Although undecided in Idaho,
courts in other jurisdictions have
held and commentators have made
clear that leading questions are
generally inappropriate on redirect
examination and are, therefore, ob-
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jectionable.17 Indeed, one court held
that the failure to object to leading
questions on re-direct examina-
tion in a criminal case amounted
to "unprofessional errors" constitut-
ing ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, although the court ultimately
concluded that the error was not
prejudicial." However, a number of
courts have held that a trial court has
discretion to permit leading ques-
tions on re-direct examination."
Courts typically allow leading ques-
tions on re-direct to rebut an impli-
cation raised on cross-examination,2"
or under circumstances where lead-
ing questions would be permitted
on direct examination-e.g., where
the witness is a child,2' is hostile,22 or
has difficulty communicating2 1
Many defending lawyers fail to
object to leading questions on re-
direct, most likely because they just
finished a series of leading questions
on cross-examination and their op-
ponent's continued use of them
"sounds" right.
Take away: Just because a witness
is being questioned on re-direct ex-
amination does not mean that op-
posing counsel is permitted to lead
the witness with impunity Objec-
tions can and should be made to
leading questions on re-direct ex-
amrination-unless an exception ap-
plies.
Objection: Nonresponsive: On oc-
casion, a witness's answer will not
fairly meet and address the ques-
tion posed. For example, when asked
what color the traffic light was, the
witness might answer: "The defen-
dant was going way too fast"
Under the Idaho Rules of Evi-
dence, a trial judge may "exercise rea-
sonable control over the mode and
order of interrogating witnesses and
presenting evidence so as to (1) make
the interrogation and presentation
effective for the ascertainment of the
truth, [and] (2) avoid needless con-
sumption of time ... "4 Thus, where
In an almost Pavlovian response, lawyers hear the words"she said"or
"he said"and quickly blurt out a hearsay objection. The rules of evidence,
however, define a great deal of out-of-court statements as non-hearsay.
a witness's answer to a question is
nonresponsive, i.e. where the answer
is not pertinent or competent, an
objection on the grounds that the
answer was nonresponsive may be
properly made .2 5But to whom does
the objection belong?
The Idaho Supreme Court has
made clear that a "nonresponsive"
objection belongs to the party ask-
ing the questions, and not to the
non-questioning party.26 Thus, as
the Idaho high court recently reiter-
ated:
The right to have an irrespon-
sive answer of a witness strick-
en out is a right of the party
examining the witness, and
not a right of the party adverse
to the examiner; if the answer
of a witness is competent and
pertinent in itself, the adverse
party has no right to have it ex-
punged from the record merely
because it was irresponsive; in
such a case it is optional with
the court to strike it out, and a
denial of a motion to do so is
no ground of error. The party
examining the witness is not,
however, bound or precluded
by an irresponsive answer, and
may himself object to its com-
petency, although the person
is his own witness. He would
seem to have an absolute right
to have the irresponsive mat-
ter expunged, regardless of its
competency.
Take away: "Nonresponsive" can
be a valid objection, but only for the
party examining the witness.
Hearsay-related objections
Objection: Hearsay: In an almost
Pavlovian response, lawyers hear
the words "she said" or "he said" and
quickly blurt out a hearsay objec-
tion. The rules of evidence, however,
define a great deal of out-of-court
statements as non-hearsay.
For example, in civil cases, almost
everything a party opponent says is
defined as non-hearsay under 801(d)
(2). In criminal cases, under the same
rule, statements of the accused are
non-hearsay admissions. Moreover, a
prior statement, through earlier tes-
timony, of a non-party witness like-
wise is defined as non-hearsay.28
Take away: Many out-of-court
statements offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted are defined as
non-hearsay.
Objection: 'State of Mind'/'Effect
on the Listener': When faced with
a hearsay objection, the examining
party will often attempt to salvage
the question by responding "non-
hearsay-goes to state of mind" or
"effect on the listener," or words to
that effect.
The Advocate * October 2017 39
Certainly, evidence concerning
an out-of-court declarant's state of
mind may be relevant and not of-
fered to prove the truth of the mat-
ter asserted by the statement.9 Thus,
when a victim-declarant expresses
fear about a defendant and the rea-
sons for it, that testimony will be ad-
missible to prove the victim's state of
mind, but not to establish the truth
of the reasons given."' Similarly, un-
der an exception to Idaho's hearsay
rule, a declarant's out-of-court state-
ment concerning his or her "then
existing state of mind ... (such as
intent, plan, motive, design, mental
feeling, pain, and bodily health),
but not including a statement of
memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed" will be
admissible for the truth of the mat-
ter asserted.31 And, when a declar-
ant makes an out-of-court statement
relevant to an issue in the case-say,
motive-the statement may be ad-
missible for "non-truth" purposes to
demonstrate the state of mind of the
defendant-or in other words, the
effect on the listener.3 2
The Idaho Supreme Court has
noted, however, that a "state of
mind" or "effect on the listener" re-
joinder to a hearsay objection is
frequently without merit.3 3 For ex-
ample, the Court recently stated that
"[i]n limited circumstances inadmis-
sible hearsay might be admissible to
show the effect on the listener, but
generally the evidence submitted is
not relevant. The effect on the listen-
er exception is often used as a ruse to
put inadmissible evidence before the
jury improperly34
Take away: An out-of-court state-
ment may survive a hearsay objec-
tion when offered to prove the state
of mind of the victim or the state-
ment's effect on the listener, or for
the hearsay purpose of proving the
declarant's state of mind or future
plans. However, most of the time, the
state of mind of the victim or defen-
dant or the effect of the statement on
the defendant will not be relevant to
a material issue in the case.
Waiver of objections/error
Objection - The Expert is Not
Qualifed Lawyers are often required
to establish a foundation that a wit-
ness is qualified to provide an expert
opinion under Rule 702. Similarly, a
702 foundation must be laid before
the results of scientific tests or opin-
ions are admitted.
When your opponent's expert
or scientific evidence lacks
foundation, flush out the
foundational shortcoming in a
motion in limine before trial or
you will risk the court finding that
your tardiness serves as a waiver
of the objection.
One of the greatest shortcomings
we have seen in establishing founda-
tions involving experts is that law-
yers wait until the middle of trial to
object. When the lawyer waits, sud-
denly-and without warning-a
court is forced to make a decision on
the admission of critical evidence.
Judges need notice and a properly
developed factual context to make
sound rulings that involve experts
and science.
Take away: When your oppo-
nent's expert or scientific evidence
lacks foundation, flush out the foun-
dational shortcoming in a motion in
limine before trial or you will risk
the court finding that your tardiness
serves as a waiver of the objection.
Failing to Object and Preserve Ap-
pellate Rights: The Idaho Rules of Ev-
idence provide that "[e]rror may not
be predicated upon a ruling which
admits or excludes evidence unless
a substantial right of the party is af-
fected, and ... [i]n case the ruling is
one admitting evidence, a timely ob-
jection or motion to strike appears of
record, stating the specific ground of
objection, if the specific ground was
not apparent from the context .. "3
When a party fails to make a
timely objection to the admission of
evidence at trial, the party waives the
right to raise the issue on appeal.
Stated another way, "[oibjections to
evidence cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal'3 7
In addition, the Idaho Supreme
Court has stated that "[a]n objection
to the admission of evidence on one
basis does not preserve a separate and
different basis for excluding the evi-
dence"38 Thus, the Court has made
clear that "[iif a person objecting
to the admission of evidence states
one ground for objection in the trial
court, which is overruled, we will
not consider on appeal whether a
different objection would have been
sustained"39 However, a party need
not object to preserve the issue on
appeal where the admission of evi-
dence affects a fundamental right.0
Appellate reversals on eviden-
tiary grounds are infrequent. The
vast majority of evidentiary rulings
are reviewed under the deferential
abuse of discretion standard.4' Even
if the trial court erred in admitting
evidence, the error will only result
in reversal if it constitutes prejudi-
cial, i.e. not harmless, error.42 To help
scale this mountain, it is imperative
for parties to object to the admission
of evidence to preserve possible er-
ror on appeal.
Take away: Although lawyers
overuse objections in many instanc-
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es, preserving error for appeal is not
one of them.
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